

TWO

Liberal-Pluralist, Classic Marxist, and "Organic-Statist" Approaches to the State

A major, nearly worldwide trend since the 1930s has been the steady growth of the role of the state in political life. In the industrialized world, the emergence of the managerial state to combat the crisis of capitalism during the depression, the widened scope of executive power in World War II, and growing state regulative and welfare functions since the war, have all contributed to the expansion of the state. In the Third World it is even clearer that most development plans call for the state to play a major role in structuring economic and social systems.

Despite this expansion of the declared and undeclared functions of the state, there had been a significant decline in theoretical analyses of the impact of state policies on society. Starting in the mid-1950s, when the field of comparative politics underwent a major period of innovation, it was widely believed by members of the profession that this subfield of political science contained the most important new contributions. When we examine this period of innovation, however, there is a striking preoccupation with the search for the underlying economic, social, and even psychological causes of political behavior. The new approaches in comparative politics in most cases assigned little independent weight to the impact of state policies and political structures on the social system. Without denying the gains to comparative politics made by the move away from a sterile emphasis on descriptive studies of a formal-legal nature, it is clear that a price has been paid, namely a retreat from what should be one of the central concerns of the discipline. While almost everywhere the role of the state grew, one of the few places it withered away was in political science.¹

1. Indicative of the tone of mainstream North American literature is the fact that when I culled *World Politics* and the *American Political Science Review* for articles on the state in the period 1958-72, the period in which comparative politics underwent intensive reconceptualization, I uncovered only one major article that explicitly attempted a

This chapter was first published in Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 3-45.

The first task of this chapter, therefore, is conceptual, namely to examine what role the state plays in some of the major models used in contemporary political analysis. Is the state analyzed as an independent variable that has an impact on society, or is it treated as a dependent variable? If the latter, what problems for empirical research are presented by such conceptual approaches and what reformulations are indicated?

My second task in this chapter is analytical and empirical. Are there models that emphasize the role of the state that have been neglected by contemporary political science? Can an awareness of these alternative models help overcome some of the major conceptual and empirical lacunae that characterize much work in contemporary political science? And, less generally, are there political systems that have been influenced by these alternative institutional, administrative, and normative models? If so, it might greatly aid the analysis of politics in such societies to incorporate explicitly elements of these models into our research strategies.

I argue that there exists a recognizable strand of political thought, which I call "organic-statist," that runs from Aristotle, through Roman law, natural law, absolutist and modern Catholic social thought. I suggest that organic statism represents powerful philosophical and structural tendencies found throughout Western Europe, and especially in the Iberian countries and their former colonies, where organic statism was never as fully challenged by alternative political models as in the rest of the European cultural area. In addition, I argue that a modern variant of the organic-statist model of society provides a useful analytic framework with which to begin investigating the interrelationship of state and society in one of the more important and original political experiments in modern Latin American history—Peru. But first it is necessary to review the basic assumptions about the role of the state in some of the major models of political life.

I begin with an examination of liberal pluralism and the classical Marxist model of the role of the state in capitalist societies, because in their various guises these two models are the most influential competing methodological paradigms used in contemporary political analysis.² As such, I think it is useful to indicate to what extent some of the major lines of development of both of

general theoretical analysis of the state. That article was J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* (July 1968). A telling analysis of the reductionist problem in the political development literature is Joseph LaPalombara's review article, "Political Power and Political Development," *Yale Law Journal* (June 1969). A very useful general discussion of three major perspectives on the relationship between state and society is Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and the Political Community," *European Journal of Sociology* (1960). Fortunately in the last few years there has been a renewed attention to the question of the state in social science and this book hopes to contribute to this reassessment.

2. The Leninist model of the state during the dictatorship of the proletariat is of course quite different from the Marxist model of the bourgeois state. In the concluding section of this chapter I contrast organic-statist and Leninist (or more generically "command socialist") models.

these theories treat the political sphere as a dependent variable, and to indicate some of the empirical and conceptual problems created by an excessive reliance on either approach.³ A brief discussion of these two approaches is an indispensable prelude to a more extensive analysis of the organic-statist approach for two reasons. First, as a body of literature, from the mid-nineteenth century on, much of the corpus of organic-statist writing has been developed and modified in explicit normative opposition to both liberal pluralism and Marxism. It is therefore important to clarify how these three approaches differ on most of the central questions of political philosophy—on the role of the individual, the nature of the political community, the common good, and most importantly, the state. Second, at the empirical level of twentieth-century Latin American politics, the major political leaders who have attempted to impose corporatist variants of the organic-statist vision of politics on their countries have invariably acted as though liberal and Marxist ideologies and structures were the major obstacles in their path. It is therefore imperative from the point of view of the present analysis to consider the interaction of liberalism, Marxism, and organic statism.

A final preliminary note. By no means do I intend to advocate the normative or analytic superiority of the organic-statist model over that of either liberal pluralism or Marxism. I do, however, want to make explicit the analytic implications of the different models. Most models usually fuse normative, descriptive, and methodological components. However, for analytic purposes these components can be separated. That is, in part, models are *normative statements* about what societies should be like. In part they are *empirical descriptions* of how societies are. In part they are *methodological approaches* suggesting what aspects of political life are important to study.

Models
(descriptive)

Classical Marxism and liberalism pluralism, in very different ways, contain vivid descriptions of what societies are like empirically that tend to portray the state as a dependent variable. Analysts working with either a classical Marxist or liberal-pluralist vision of the real world tend to use methodological approaches to study political life that, as I will attempt to demonstrate, all too frequently systematically draw attention away from consideration of the state as a possible independent variable. Normatively, both models also contain (for different reasons) negative evaluations of the state. My point in reviewing the literature on Marxism and liberal pluralism is not to dismiss them but rather to underscore characteristic research problems presented by both models and to suggest subthemes within both models that, if recast, are useful for contemporary research into state–society relations.

3. Numerous exceptions exist, even within Marxist and pluralist writings, to this sweeping statement, and this chapter does not intend, or pretend, to be a comprehensive survey of all approaches. Rather I have deliberately focused on major theoretical strands that assign little independent weight to the state because I feel it is intellectually imperative to confront directly the research consequences of these schemes.

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Organic statism, in contrast to liberal pluralism and classical Marxism, is seen most importantly as a normative model of the relations between state and society and not primarily as a methodological approach.⁴ However, elites in many different societies, and in different historical periods, have used variants of the organic-statist model as a legitimizing formula—or at times even as a guide—for designing institutions, systems, and administrative structures. Where such state-structured interactions have played a role in shaping societies empirically, then the methodological implications are clear, namely, that at a bare minimum we must design research (even where Marxist or pluralist assumptions figure prominently) so that we are able to assess the comparative weight of the state and/or society in determining political outcomes. My own analytic position, which will emerge more clearly as the book unfolds, is that all three approaches are in some basic respects seriously deficient. Liberal pluralism and a major strand of classical Marxism are deficient largely because of their presuppositions of the near autonomy of society, and organic statism because of its presupposition of the near autonomy of the state. I hope that this book will indicate the necessity of greater theoretical integration of the two obviously non-autonomous spheres: state and society.

The Liberal-Pluralist Approach to the State

In the liberal-pluralist approach the main normative, empirical, and methodological concern is with individuals who, pursuing their individual economic and political interests, together make up society. In pluralist theory, individuals may form into groups, but because they all have a variety of interests they tend to associate themselves with numerous and different groups whose interests cross-cut. A methodological and normative assumption among both political and economic thinkers in the liberal-pluralist tradition is that it is undesirable to use the concept of the general good. Instead, individual utility for the constituent members of society is most nearly achieved when individuals are allowed to pursue freely their own economic and political interests.⁵

4. However, at the end of the chapter I recast organic statism so that it can be studied as an abstract model of governance with its own characteristic requirements and predicaments, just as David Apter has performed a similar task for his “secular-libertarian” and “sacred-collectivity” models in *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 28–36.

5. The literature is far too extensive and too well known to summarize here. Two excellent critical reviews of the literature that develop some of the points only briefly touched on here are Sheldon Wolin’s, “Liberalism and the Decline of Political Philosophy,” and “The Age of Organization and the Sublimation of Politics,” chs. 9 and 10 of his *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), 286–435. See also Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), esp. chs. 1–3. A useful

The normative and empirical distinction between the “collective interest in the common good” and the “sum of individual interests,” which in organic statism or in welfare economics going back to Pareto necessitates a major role for the state in the economy, is obliterated in classical liberal economics because of the supposition that the pursuit of individual interests will in itself produce the best good for society.⁶ The classic formulation of the “hidden hand” mechanism that produces this harmony of interests is, of course, that of Adam Smith: “Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.”⁷

For the classical liberal theoretician, the hidden hand of the market mechanism itself would appear to perform—and perform better—almost all the functions that in other theories are seen as being performed by the state. The clear injunction was to let society regulate itself without interference. Society was a homeostatic system with only minimal need for a state. Thus Jeremy Bentham argued, “The general rule is, that nothing ought to be done or attempted by government. The motto, or watchword of government, on these occasions, ought to be—Be quiet. . . . With few exceptions, and these not very considerable ones, the attainment of the maximum of enjoyment will be most effectually secured by leaving each individual to pursue his own maximum enjoyment.”⁸

Though the role of the state is apparently reduced to a minimum because of the self-regulating market mechanism, it is often lost sight of that Adam Smith, in a much less well-known passage, in fact assigned three distinct duties to the state:

First, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society.⁹

analysis and anthology of English liberal thought is Alan Bullock and Maurice Shock (eds.), *The Liberal Tradition: From Fox to Keynes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).

6. See my discussion of the significance of the common good in organic statism in this chapter. Pareto's distinction between the “utility of the collectivity” and the “utility of the members,” and his argument that “far from coinciding these utilities often stand in basic opposition,” is found in Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society: A Treatise in General Sociology* (New York: Dover, 1935), nos. 2110–2128, esp. no. 2115.

7. *The Wealth of Nations*, 2 vols., Everyman (London: Deut, 1910), i. 398.

8. *A Manual of Political Economy*, reproduced in Bullock and Shock (eds.), *The Liberal Tradition*, pp. xxiii–iv, 28–9.

9. *The Wealth of Nations*, ii. 180–1.

The point then, is, not that society is actually self-regulating but that the market mechanism is assumed to be self-regulating *only if* the state provides the indispensable neutral and impartial administrative, institutional, and physical infrastructures for capitalism to function. This is, in fact, quite a large task for the state to perform in any society, and, far from being automatic, its performance requires great political skill and power. When we turn to the task of the late developing countries, the fact that they are follower economies makes many of the indispensable infrastructure expenditures "unprofitable for any individual," and the role of the state more crucial.¹⁰ Since 1964 Brazil, for example, has been widely regarded as following a liberal, market mechanism model of development. Yet Roberto Campos, a chief economic architect of the regime, believed that, in order to make the market mechanism work, large-scale and systematic state investment and intervention was required in almost all facets of the country's economic, and especially social, structures. The last decade of market mechanism rule in Brazil thus not so paradoxically ushered in one of the most important epochs of expansion of the scope of state power in Brazil's history.¹¹

Twentieth-century pluralism, especially the group-theory variant whose most noted exponents are Arthur Bentley and David Truman, allows for a more positive role for the state. Nonetheless, it implicitly shares with classical liberalism the presupposition that society is basically self-regulating.¹² The functional equivalent of the market's hidden hand in group theory is competition among groups combined with cross-cutting membership among groups. This is the essential self-regulating principle of group theory. In group theory, as in liberal theory more generally, the analysis begins with a concern with how individuals act: "No individual is wholly absorbed in any group to which he

10. For a seminal discussion of the role of the state in relation to the "timing" of industrialization, see Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), esp. 5–30.

11. Interview with Roberto Campos, minister of planning in the Castello Branco government, in Rio de Janeiro on September 15, 1967. For a detailed analysis of the expansion of the not-so-hidden hand of the state in order to make the market mechanism work, see Thomas Skidmore, "Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil, 1937–71," in Alfred Stepan (ed.), *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 3–46. For a fascinating discussion of how the state created an Adam Smithian "public institution," the stock market, to allow the market mechanism to operate, see David Trubek, "Law, Planning and the Development of the Brazilian Capital Market," *The Bulletin*, nos. 72–3 (Apr. 1971). For a careful analysis of the many aspects of the growth of the role of the state in the Brazilian economy since 1930 see Werner Baer, Issac Kerstenetzsky, and Anibal V. Vitella, "The Changing Role of the State in the Brazilian Economy," *World Development* (Nov. 1973). Also see Werner Baer, Richard Newfarmer and Thomas Trebatt, "On State Capitalism in Brazil: Some New Issues and Questions," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, 30 (Winter 1976), 63–93.

12. Pluralist group theory is particularly relevant for our analysis because organic statism is also a form of group theory, but one which, as we shall see, has fundamentally different premises. Although I draw somewhat different conclusions, I profited much by reading John F. Witte, "Theories of American Pluralism: The Writings of Arthur F. Bentley, David Truman, and Robert A. Dahl," MS, Yale University, May 17, 1973.

belongs. Only a fraction of his attitudes is expressed through any one such affiliation... An individual generally belongs to several groups—a family, a church, an economic institution, and frequently a very large number of associations, perhaps sixty or seventy for active ‘joiners’ in our society.”¹³ After establishing the fact of multiple memberships, the next step in the analysis is to establish their cross-cutting character: “The demands and standards of these various groups may and frequently do come in conflict with one another... We must start from the fact that the equilibrium of an individual consists of his adjustment in the various institutionalized groups and associations to which he belongs.”¹⁴

In group theory the empirical and methodological consequences of multiple overlapping memberships are many and significant. It is the central argument used to dismiss the class basis of Marxist theory, on the ground that unified class consciousness (whether upper or lower class) is an untenable concept in the face of the fragmenting impact of multiple cross-pressures.¹⁵ Also the central normative role for the state as being functionally necessary for the regulation of conflict, a role found in numerous variants of organic statism, is rejected by group theorists because in group theory conflict regulation is basically an autonomous outcome of the interaction of different groups. Pluralistic group theory sees the multiple cross-pressures in society as performing the function of inducing a tendency toward bargaining and compromise both in the individual and in the individual’s groups, which strive to maintain group unity in the midst of cross-pressures. “The heterogeneity of membership that causes internal difficulties in all such groups tempers the claims of an occupational interest through the process of internal compromise and adjustment.”¹⁶

This approach, while plausible in high consensus situations, is less appropriate in societies where cleavages are compounded or in crisis situations where, despite cross-pressures, some pressures assume greater salience in terms of the stakes involved than others. In both the above cases the hypothesized self-regulating process has little behavioral impact and the role of the state apparatus and strategic political elites often becomes crucial in determining the outcome.¹⁷

Bentley does not really discuss the empirical possibility of the state elite’s altering the effective power of potential groups either by using repression to dismantle the organizational capacity of some groups or by seeking to broaden

13. David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 157.

14. *Ibid.* 157, 162.

15. For their arguments rejecting the Marxist concept of class, see Truman, *The Governmental Process*, 165–6, and Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908), 207–8.

16. Truman, *The Governmental Process*, 166, also 514. Bentley speaks of the “limitless criss-cross of groups”; *The Process of Government*, 206.

17. For an excellent discussion along these lines see Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University Press, 1972), esp. 93–101.

the social base for the state elite's programs by organizing from above a group that otherwise would not be able to organize effectively. His assumption is that "when we have a group that participates in the political system we have always another group facing it in the same plane."¹⁸ Truman does not assert that opposing groups are actually organized, but he does place great weight on the fact that all interests are potential interest groups and that, as such, other actual powerful groups will take them into account. Thus the balancing (or repressive) function does not need to be performed by the government because it is the "multiple memberships in potential groups based on widely held and accepted interests that serve as the balance wheel in a going political system like that of the United States."¹⁹ In the writings of Bentley this methodological emphasis on group forces relegates the concept of the "state" to the "intellectual amusements of the past."²⁰

As to the government's adding significantly to the sum total of interest group pressures, or being an agent reshaping the balance of forces in society, Bentley rules this out: "the governing body has no value in itself, except as one aspect of the process, and cannot even be adequately described except in terms of the deep-lying interests which function through it."²¹ He accepts the idea that the government or the permanent bureaucracy could be considered an interest group, but insists that as such it would have no autonomous interests because its interests would reflect other more fundamental interest groups in society.²²

Although other variants of contemporary North American political science are not as reductionist as the interest group theorists, there is a widespread tendency to look for the underlying nonpolitical forces in society and to reduce greatly the autonomy of the state or the government. Significantly, in the elaborate Parsonian schema, society, culture, and personality are judged to be

18. Bentley, *The Process of Government*, 220. He presents no convincing evidence for this and does not address the question of comparative power. For a useful corrective to Bentley's approach, see Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, rev. edn. (New York: Schocken Books, 1971).

19. Truman, *The Governmental Process*, 514. Once again little hard evidence is given to support this proposition and no discussion of the theoretical or normative problem of "non-issues."

20. "The 'State' itself is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, no factor in our investigation," and "The 'idea of the state' has been very prominent, no doubt, among the intellectual amusements of the past, and at particular places and times it has served to help give coherence and pretentious expression to some particular group's activity. But in either case it is too minute a factor to deserve space in a book covering so broad a range as this." Bentley, *The Process of Government*, 263-4.

21. *Ibid.* 300.

22. *Ibid.* 290. While his theory is mainly concerned with modern societies, Bentley argues that group theory would hold for all societies, even in the extreme case of absolute despotism. For the despot himself is merely an expression of the underlying balance of forces in society: "When we take such an agency of government as a despotic ruler, we cannot possibly advance to an understanding of him except in terms of the group activities of his society which are most directly represented through him. Always and everywhere our study must be a study of the interests that work through government; otherwise we have not got down to the facts" (pp. 270-1).

worthy of relatively autonomous levels of analysis, but politics is not.²³ Gabriel Almond, in his influential introduction to *The Politics of Developing Areas*, a book that ushered in a decade of new field research, notes that "It was the conviction of the collaborators in this study that . . . the input functions, rather than the output, would be most important in characterizing non-Western political systems, and in discriminating types and stages of political development among them."²⁴ Later in the same introduction, Almond acknowledges that "While there is justification for having underplayed the governmental structures in this study, their neglect in the development of the theory of the functions of the polity represents a serious shortcoming in the present analysis."²⁵

It is safe to say that, despite empirical refinements, there never was a major methodological advance in this approach in regard to the role of public policy or the state, and that, by and large, the prestigious Social Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics contributed heavily to the reductionist tendency to look for nonpolitical explanations of political behavior.²⁶

Yet another attempt to analyze a total political system is that of David Easton.²⁷ His systems analysis approach shares an important dimension with Almond's functional approach, namely an elaborate discussion of inputs but a very cursory analysis of the role that the government plays in shaping inputs and generating its own policies or outputs. Easton does not deny that government can play a role in generating inputs, but even here he characteristically redirects attention back to the need to examine the overall cultural, environmental, and social backgrounds of the "gatekeepers" rather than to the black box of government itself.²⁸

A research strategy that is limited to the pluralist, interest-group perspective, while it is certainly useful for some problems, all too often takes for granted what it should be demonstrating, namely that a plurality of interests plays a determining role in shaping policy. This implicit assumption often contributes to a systematic neglect both of the state's role in taking independent policy initiatives, and of the impact of state policy on the structure of society,

23. See Talcott Parsons, E. A. Shils *et al.*, *Toward a General Theory of Action* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 28–29.

24. Gabriel Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 17. The four input functions were (1) political socialization and recruitment, (2) interest articulation, (3) interest aggregation and (4) political communication. In fact, all four "input functions" may be strongly structured by government policy as I demonstrate in other chapters.

25. *Ibid.*, 55.

26. For an interesting critique along these lines by a prominent member of the SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics, see LaPalombara, "Political Power and Political Development," 1259.

27. He has developed this in various publications. The two most important are his *A Framework for Political Analysis* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1965), and *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965).

28. Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, 97–9.

especially on the types of inputs that social groups can in fact make on the state.²⁹ To cite one obvious example, in many countries trade unions are subject to prohibitions against organization, or at least are restricted to operating within a legal and administrative network of regulations that has a profound impact on how the unions' interests are organized and articulated.³⁰ A closely related neglected question concerns the role of state policy in creating groups from above and then establishing guidelines on how they can act.

These examples suggest that the neglect of the institutional, class, and ideological context within which interest groups operate is a serious problem. The dominant supposition of group theorists is that interest groups operate in an *unchartered* context. Significantly, Truman quotes approvingly Bentley's summary statement: "The very nature of the group process (which our government shows in a fairly well-developed form) is this, that groups are freely combining, dissolving, and recombining in accordance with their interest lines."³¹

As a description of the real world, this suffers from the obvious limitation that, for most societies throughout most of history, interest groups have not been at liberty to "freely combine." Quite often, as our later discussion of the organic-statist tradition will make clear, they have been very strictly *chartered* by the state in accordance with the state's, and not the groups', "own interest lines." Reliance on a theoretical scheme that posits freely combining interest groups and a passive, neutral state seriously limits the range of cases that can be considered because only with great difficulty can such a perspective deal with such contemporary architectonic party-states as China and the Soviet Union, where the party-based controllers of the state apparatus have clearly been reasonably successful in imposing their ideological and organizational designs on the body politic.³² It leads also to historical parochialism, because even

29. My specific intention here is to indicate conceptual and empirical lacunae in regard to state policy in pluralist—especially group—theory. There is of course a voluminous literature devoted to general critiques of pluralism. Some of the more prominent attacks are Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*; Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review* (Dec. 1962); Michael Parenti, "Power and Pluralism: A View from the Bottom," *Journal of Politics* (Aug. 1970); and William E. Connolly (ed.), *The Bias of Pluralism* (New York: Atherton Press, 1967).

30. In the next two chapters of *The State and Society* I document in extensive detail the effective array of corporatist mechanisms the Brazilian and Mexican state elites have constructed to control unions.

31. Truman, *The Governmental Process*, 167, and Bentley, *The Process of Government*, 359.

32. Schurmann's book on China, for example, begins with a clear acknowledgment of the power of the party-state to redesign and rebuild Chinese society: "Chinese communism came to power and created the present People's Republic of China . . . They have rebuilt a great country, disciplined its people, improved the conditions of life, and laid the foundations for growth . . . We are concerned with the systematic structures created by these men. Communist China is like a vast building made of different kinds of brick and stone. However it was put together, it stands. What holds it together is ideology and organization." See Franz Schurmann's *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, 2nd edn., rev. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 1. For a telling critique of the lack of usefulness of Almond's analytical framework for dealing with contemporary communist regimes, see Robert A. Dowse, "A Functionalist's Logic," *World Politics* (June 1966). This is not to imply, as the literature on totalitarianism had earlier, that attention

though it is clear that a promising area for political development theory lies in longitudinal historical analysis, many of the dominant theoretical schemes, with their view of the state as a dependent variable and their emphasis on relatively free and powerful interest groups, have great difficulty in dealing adequately with major spans of Western political life. For example, in many Greek, Italian Renaissance, and Swiss city-states, the private sphere of interests was relatively small compared to the political sphere in which the government structured activities. The unchartered interest-group focus has even greater limitations as an analytic approach when the task is the study of power in such formative phases of European political history as the Roman Empire, seventeenth-century absolutism, or the two Napoleonic regimes, in all of which there was a major accumulation of power by the state at the expense of interest groups. As we shall see when we analyze the political philosophy and practice of organic statism in Europe, the state placed strict and effective controls on associations. Despite the rejection of some aspects of the organic-statist approach in the absolutist period, it is clear that state control of interest groups was, if anything, intensified.

Another problem for group theory relates to the question of selective access. Even in societies that were once assumed to approximate closely the pluralist political model, such as England or Sweden, the semi-planned nature of the political economy has given rise to a policy consultation stage that has significantly altered the nature of the input process by interest groups. Before new measures (which are increasingly drawn up by government initiative) are formally considered by the legislature, they are systematically vetted by a consultative committee consisting of the ministerial or public agency representatives delegated by the state, the representatives of employee organizations, the representatives of employer organizations, and occasionally a representative of a public interest group.³³ The crucial point is that the state

to groups in strong party states is irrelevant. For an attempt at utilizing "interest group" analysis for the Soviet Union, see H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths (eds.), *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). The Skilling approach, however, has a serious conceptual weakness: the confusion of "group politics" with "pluralist interest group politics." In fact a strong case could probably be made that the role of groups in Eastern Europe has more in common at the structural level with the organic-statist or corporatist traditions of chartered group politics than it does with the pluralist interest group tradition. One of the few scholars to begin to develop this potentially fruitful line of inquiry into the relationship of groups to the state in communist societies is Andrew C. Janos, "Group Politics in Communist Society: A Second Look at the Pluralist Model," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds.), *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

33. In Sweden such committees play a central role in the political process. In the 1961-7 period, 60% of the commissioners were civil servants (up from 41% in 1945-54) and the nonconflictual behaviour of the other members is indicated by the fact that three-fourths of all commissions presented unanimous proposals; see Hans Meijer, "Bureaucracy and Policy Formulation in Sweden," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 4 (1969), 103-16. For an interesting comparative study that makes a strong case that bureaucracies were the "most consistently important" group in shaping welfare policies

plays a central role in determining which groups are represented in this policy process.³⁴ *Access capability* also has an impact on the strength or weakness of groups. Groups that can demonstrate reasonably good access capability are often in a superior position to maintain or even accrue support from constituents than those that are perceived to be outside this process of consultation. In addition, since group leaders want to maintain their own power and prestige, which often is derived from their membership on such a consultative committee, they often will be tempted to tailor their groups' demands to stay within the general policy framework being pursued by the government.³⁵ Because the state plays such a pivotal role in agenda setting, access granting, constituency support capability, and interest-group demand formulation, it obviously plays a central part in shaping the input process even in "pluralistic" politics.³⁶

Classical Marxist Theory of the State in Capitalist Societies

As in much of liberal-pluralist thought, a main line of argumentation in the classical Marxist theory of bourgeois society treats the state largely as a dependent variable.³⁷ Since this aspect of Marxist thought has played a preponderant

in Britain and Sweden and that the earlier emergence of certain welfare policies in Sweden than in Britain was due more to variance in state administrative structures than to the power of organized political pressures see, Hugh Hecló, *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), esp. 42–60, 301–21, quote from p. 301.

34. Joseph LaPalombara discusses the question of "structured access" in his *Interest Groups in Italian Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), esp. 258–70.

35. This process has not received the attention it deserves. Two seminal works that begin to address the subject are by Samuel H. Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), and Stein Rokkan, "Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism," in Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Opposition in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 70–116, esp. 105–10. Significantly, Rokkan cites no English language work that discusses this aspect of Norwegian politics.

36. Philippe C. Schmitter's stimulating "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in Fredrick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch (eds.), *The New Corporatism: Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 85–131, argues—correctly I think—that corporatist structures are becoming more prominent in countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. However he argues that such structures have largely emerged from the interest groups themselves—thus his term "societal corporatism"—whereas I attach significant independent weight to the role the state has played in forging such structured interactions.

37. By classical Marxist theory, I mean the theory found in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. A number of good studies are devoted to this difficult subject. An analysis that places Marx's view of the state within the context of his general philosophy is Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), esp. 17–64. A book that focuses specifically on the political theory of Marx and Engels is Robert Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), esp. 54–81. See also Ralph Miliband, "Marx and the State," *Socialist Register* (1965),

role in shaping subsequent “economistic” Marxist analyses of the state, I shall treat it first. Later I shall analyze subthemes in Marx’s writings concerning hegemonic crises and Bonapartism that, if properly understood, offer rich, nondeterministic, theoretical insights about such crucial questions as the relative autonomy of the state. Unfortunately, Marx died before he was able to begin a full-scale systematic treatment of the state.³⁸ Nonetheless, he had already written enough about the relation of the state to society for us to discuss certain broad themes. For in fact Marx had always been interested in the question of the state. Significantly, his first major work, the critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* was largely devoted to a criticism of Hegel’s view of the state.

In traditional liberal-pluralist thought, the analytical starting point is with the individual, who is seen as acting alone or with other groups of individuals to advance his private interests. Marx rejects the atomistic starting-point of liberal pluralism on the methodological grounds that it is impossible to discuss any individual without at the same time discussing the sum total of the relationships within which individuals are intermeshed.³⁹ For Marx, the most fundamental of these relationships involves the mode of production, and thus both individualist psychology and individualist politics are rejected. Marx’s basic statement of the relationship of politics to economics is found in his famous preface to the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*:

legal relations as well as forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the material conditions of life.... The anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy.... The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political super-structure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general.⁴⁰

The hidden hand of classical liberalism and the group competition and cross-cutting cleavages of pluralism imply there is fruitful competition and a minimum of systematic conflict or coercion. Though there is no sense of the

278–96; John Sanderson, “Marx and Engels on the State,” *Western Political Quarterly* (Dec. 1963); John Plamenatz, *German Marxism and Russian Communism* (London: Longman, Green, 1954), 135–64; and the important interpretations by Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, trans. Timothy O’Hagan (London: New Left Books and Sheed & Ward, 1973), and Jean-Claude Girardin, “Sur la théorie marxiste de l’Etat,” *Les Temps Modernes* (Sept.–Oct. 1972).

38. For Marx’s intention to write such a work, see Karl Marx, “Preface to a Critique of Political Economy,” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, I (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1958), 361.

39. See Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), 33–46. For an analysis of Marx’s critique of “atomistic individualism” see Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, 17–18, 33.

40. Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, I, 362–3. Engels often formulated the relationship of the political superstructure to the economic structure in much less subtle and more deterministic language. See, for example, his prefaces to the German edition (1883) and the English edition (1888) of the *Communist Manifesto*, in *Selected Works*, I, 24, 28.

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collective community as such, as there is in organic statism, classical liberal pluralism in theory can result in a contribution to the greatest good of the greatest number. These assumptions are flatly rejected by classical Marxism. Once division of labor occurs, "every form of society has been based . . . on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes."⁴¹ Between classes the economic conflict is basically a zero-sum relationship: "Every advance in production is at the same time a retrogression in the condition of the oppressed class, that is, of the great majority. What is a boon for the one is necessarily a bane for the other; each new emancipation of one class always means a new oppression of another class."⁴²

Given the fact that the economic structure is the basis for the political superstructure, the liberal assumption that the state will provide neutral procedural guarantees for free political and economic competition is rejected. The state, at least in Engels's formulation, is exclusively the coercive instrument of the dominant class: "The State . . . in all typical periods is exclusively the state of the ruling class, and in all cases remains essentially a machine for keeping down the oppressed, exploited class."⁴³ The famous passage in the Communist Manifesto that "The Executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" thus posits a relationship in which the state is the dependent variable and the economic system is the independent variable.⁴⁴

Since for classical Marxism the state originally arose as a necessary means of coercion once division of labor occurred, the state remains as an instrument of oppression until the proletarian revolution eliminates all class distinctions by eliminating capitalism. This can only be accomplished when the proletariat in turn uses the state as a means of repression during the transitional stage of the "dictatorship of the proletariat."⁴⁵ Once private ownership is abolished, and class distinctions eventually eliminated, the need for the state as an instrument

41. The *Communist Manifesto*, in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, i. 45.

42. Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, ii. 295. This essay is one of the most detailed treatments of the state to be found in the writings of Marx and Engels. All further references to this work refer to the *Selected Works* edition. For Marxist social science, the fact that Engels, not Marx, wrote most extensively on the state was unfortunate because, as noted, Engels's analysis of the relationship of the superstructure to the structure was often presented in much more mechanistic terms than that found in Marx. To this extent my strictures about "classical Marxism" apply more directly to Engels. Nonetheless, since Engels's works had a great influence on Marxist social science, it would be sociologically unacceptable to exclude his works when we are evaluating the legacy of classical Marxism in regard to the analysis of the state.

43. *Ibid.* 294.

44. Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, i. 36.

45. On the need for the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat, see Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program*, in *Selected Works*, ii. 30. For Engels's attack on anarchic socialists who would not use authoritarian means to maintain the victorious revolution, see his "On Authority," in *Selected Works*, i. 636-7. Also see V. I. Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 420-7.

of class oppression no longer exists. At this stage classical Marxism shares with classical liberalism the assumption that society can essentially be internally self-managed. Emancipated society has the autonomous, noncoercive managerial capacity to regulate itself. In contrast to the basic assumptions of organic statism, the state in pure communism is seen as both functionally unnecessary, and normatively undesirable for society. As Engels said, "The society that will organize production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe."⁴⁶

The above summarizes a main line of argument of the classical Marxist theory of the state under normal conditions. As in classical liberalism, the state apparently does not play a relatively independent role in the political process. Until the classless society comes into being, the state is envisaged as the instrument of coercion of the dominant economic class, and as such, much research that confines itself to the above aspects of the classical Marxist tradition is directed almost exclusively to the underlying economic forces in society. As Nicos Poulantzas, himself a Marxist, laments, "a long Marxist tradition has considered that the State is only a simple tool or instrument manipulated at will by the ruling class."⁴⁷ As he acknowledges, this has often led to "economism" which "considers that other levels of social reality, including the State, are simple epiphenomena reducible to the economic 'base'. Thereby a specific study of the State becomes superfluous. Parallel with this, economism considers that every change in the social system happens first of all in the economy and that political action should have the economy as its principal objective. Once again, a specific study of the State is redundant."⁴⁸

Such a methodological orientation leaves so little scope for overall dynamic analysis of situations that a number of neo-Marxists have argued that the treatment of the state is one of the weakest areas in much Marxist social science. As Ralph Miliband notes: "Marxists have made little notable attempt to confront the question of the state in the light of the concrete socio-economic and political and cultural reality of actual capitalist societies."⁴⁹

However, there are neglected subthemes in Marx and Engels that, if read properly and applied to the special conditions of late developing,

46. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (New York: International Publishers, 1942), 292. The even more famous passage describing the withering away of the state is found in the second chapter of the third part of Engels's *Anti-Dühring*.

47. Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," *New Left Review*, no. 58 (Nov.-Dec. 1969), 74.

48. *Ibid.* 68.

49. See his *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 6, emphasis in the original. He cites a similar judgment made by Paul Sweezy. A major exception that should be made is the work of the Italian Communist party leader and theoretician Antonio Gramsci. His concepts of hegemony and class fractions will be discussed and used in later chapters. Miliband's book and especially Poulantzas's *Political Power and Social Classes* are important attempts to invigorate the Marxist analysis of the state.

dependent-capitalist societies such as those in Latin America, in fact provide much less theoretical foundation for the neglect of the state than do many conventional Marxist interpretations.

Classical Marxist writings give two major qualifications to the description of the state as a dependent variable: the nonhegemonic qualification and the qualification concerning the permanent tendency toward parasitic bureaucratic autonomy. Taken together, these should constitute an impressive a priori theoretical justification for considering the state as a major source of relatively independent political action even within the Marxist model.

Consider first the implications of the hegemony hypothesis. Engels asserts that the state "in all typical periods is exclusively the state of the ruling class." But how typical are "typical" periods? Apparently, for a period to be typical, a hegemonic class must exist. But how often does even Engels consider that there is a situation of class hegemony? His discussion of periods that are not typical merits quotation at length:

By way of exception, however, periods occur in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of independence of both. Such was the absolute monarchy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which held the balance between the nobility and the class of the burghers; such was the Bonapartism of the First, and still more of the Second French Empire, which played off the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. The latest performance of this kind, in which ruler and ruled appear equally ridiculous, is the new German Empire of the Bismarck nation: here capitalists and workers are balanced against each other and equally cheated for the benefit of the impoverished Prussian cabbage junkers.⁵⁰

Writing toward the end of the nineteenth century, Engels saw, therefore, much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as nonhegemonic, and extensive periods in the nineteenth-century history of the two major European powers as characterized by nonhegemonic class relations.

Whether or not there is a hegemonic class or fraction of a class capable of ruling politically in any given situation is thus not to be assumed. Rather it is to be determined by empirical investigation of the relationship between the economic structure and the class structure and by a detailed analysis of the relationship between class fractions and the control of the state apparatus.⁵¹

50. Engels, *The Origin of the Family*, 290–1. In *The Civil War in France*, Marx gives a similar explanation of the rise of Bonapartism: "In reality, it was the only form of government possible at a time when the bourgeoisie had already lost, and the working class had not yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the nation," in *Selected Works*, i. 518.

51. The lack of hegemony is not only due to economic equilibrium. In fact Poulantzas argues that, due to the *normal* difficulties preventing the bourgeoisie from achieving sufficient unity to create their own hegemonic political organization, the "relative autonomy of the state" is a constituent feature of capitalism and in this sense Bonapartism is the "religion of the bourgeoisie"; *Political Power and Social Classes*, 281–5. Ralph Miliband, in his "The Capitalist State: Reply to Nicos Poulantzas," *New Left Review*, no. 59 (Jan.–Feb. 1970), 58, argues (correctly I think) that by labeling all capitalist states "Bona-

With reference to Latin America, numerous studies indicate that, within the context of late-industrializing, dependent economies, the national bourgeoisie has not been able to attain a hegemonic situation comparable to that achieved by the bourgeoisie in England, the United States, and some countries in Europe, nor has a hegemonic industrial proletariat emerged.

The reasons for the nonhegemonic class situation are complex but interrelated. The high degree of foreign ownership of industry reduces the relative size and power of the national bourgeoisie, while the national bourgeoisie itself often has a variety of credit, ownership, technological, and marketing dependency relationships with international capital. This, plus their frequent status as relatively recent immigrants, puts members of the national bourgeoisie in a weak political position to compete—in a nationalist environment—as an electoral force aiming at hegemonic acceptance for their position. The character of late dependent industrialization that has followed, not preceded, modernization means that, in comparison to Anglo-Saxon patterns, fewer workers are employed in industry at similar stages of development due to capital intensive methods, and the number of urban workers in the tertiary and marginal sectors is much higher. This pattern of industrialization has not been supportive of the consolidation of large, class-conscious, autonomous worker organizations.⁵²

If something like this is in fact the case for much of Latin America and other parts of the Third World, then even from a Marxist perspective we should expect the state to play a large role in mediating conflict between nonhegemonic classes, and the question of the relative autonomy of the state apparatus should be central in any research strategy about politics in such systems.

The second major qualification about the state as a dependent variable in classical Marxism comes in the discussion by Marx and Engels of the tendency toward the parasitic autonomy of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. Throughout their work they argue that, as class conflict intensifies, the repressive apparatus must become larger; this sets into motion a bureaucratic

partist" it is difficult to make the significant distinction between the meaning of "relative autonomy of the state" under fascism and under a social-democratic regime. At the very least, the debate highlights the fact that the creation of political domination via the state apparatus is the result of shifting coalitions of class fractions and that the forging (or nonforging) of a "hegemonic block" is a fit subject for independent analysis, whether by the political scientist, or—as in the case of Gramsci—by the Marxist party theoretician and tactician.

52. For an excellent discussion of the structure and ideology of the bourgeoisie under such conditions, see Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Ideologías de la burguesía industrial en sociedades dependientes (Argentina y Brasil)* (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno Editors, 1971). For a comparison with the pattern in the United States and Europe see his "The Industrial Elite," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.), *Elites in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press 1967), 94–114. For a brief comparative study of labor in Europe and Latin America see Kenneth Paul Erickson and Patrick V. Peppe, "The Dynamics of Dependency: Industrial Modernization and Tightening Controls Over the Working Class in Brazil and Chile," paper prepared for the Latin American Studies Association, Nov. 1974, and Brian H. Smith and José Luis Rodríguez, "Comparative Working-Class Political Behavior: Chile, France, and Italy," *American Behavioral Scientist* (Sept. 1974).

momentum whereby the state apparatus tends to play roles more self-determining than that envisaged in any mechanistic model of the state as a passive and malleable instrument of class coercion. Indeed, Engels goes so far as to say that this "transformation of the state and the organs of the state from servants of society into masters of society" is "an inevitable transformation in all previous states."⁵³ The tendency toward relative state autonomy is thus not restricted to nonhegemonic situations. Indeed, Marx and Engels see it as an actual, not latent, tendency in any society where there is a division of labor and therefore the need for a repressive state. The numerous references by Marx and Engels to this phenomenon indicate that they took it seriously. Marx, for example, describes the state apparatus in nineteenth-century France as one in which the state "constantly maintains an immense mass of interests and livelihoods in the most absolute dependence; where the state enmeshes, controls, regulates, superintends and tutors civil society."⁵⁴

If this is such a permanent tendency even under European conditions in a relatively well-developed civil society, one should expect that under twentieth-century Latin American conditions, where the state apparatus is often larger in comparison to civil society than it was in nineteenth-century Europe or North America, and where the state often "enmeshes, controls, regulates, superintends and tutors civil society," the problem would be even more acute.

Even in socialist societies a tendency toward bureaucratic aggrandizement rather than the hoped for withering away of the state is sufficiently prominent that it should be a central question for Marxist scholars.⁵⁵ Indeed, a major concern among some Marxists—especially Yugoslav Marxists—is, how to prevent the party-state apparatus from generating a new bureaucratic elite with special privileges that inhibit the evolution toward a more participatory, stateless communist society.⁵⁶

53. Introduction to Marx's *Civil War in France*, *Selected Works*, i. 484.

54. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, in Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, i. 284.

55. The League of Communists in Yugoslavia asserted, for example, that "bureaucratism is a great danger to socialism in the transition period," and warned against the tendency "of transforming the state into an all-embracing social force, a force above society which would in fact liquidate the direct social influence of the working masses on the policies of the state leadership—that is, the tendency of state idolatry." See *Yugoslavia's Way: The Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia*, translated by Stoyan Pribechevich (New York: All Nations Press, 1958), 117–18. Svetozar Stojanović deals with similar issues in "The Statist Myth of Socialism," in his *Between Ideals and Reality: A Critique of Socialism and its Future*, trans. Gerson S. Sher (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 37–75.

56. See, for example, Edvard Kardelj, "The Principal Dilemma: Self-Management or Statism," *Socialist Thought and Practice* (Belgrade) (Oct.–Dec. 1966), and Najdan Pašić, "Dictatorship by the Proletariat or over the Proletariat," *Socialist Thought and Practice* (Oct.–Dec. 1968). Other works by Marxist scholars which stress that the transition from socialism to communism cannot be assumed to be automatic and that it is particularly important for Marxists to analyze the state apparatus in socialist systems are Paul M. Sweezy, "Toward a Program of Studies of the Transition to Socialism," in Paul M. Sweezy and Charles Bettelheim (eds.), *On the Transition to Socialism* (New York: Monthly Review

A correct interpretation of what Marx and Engels say of the role of the state in nonhegemonic situations and of the permanent tendency toward parasitic bureaucratic autonomy means that any Marxist analysis of politics should devote extensive attention to the conditions in which the state acts with a significant degree of autonomy.

In the case of Latin America a number of central research questions flow from this discussion. For example, given a general context of late, dependent modernization that is relatively unresponsive for establishing class hegemony, how was a hegemonic block of class fractions nonetheless constructed in Mexico? The Marxist literature also often speaks of the role the state plays in the "reproduction of the means of production."⁵⁷ Analysis of this role as an independent variable becomes even more crucial when the question is that of the initial *production* by the state, rather than the mere *reproduction*, of the social and economic bases of capitalism. In such a case, as in Mexico, the state apparatus plays a central role in creating the political, ideological, and economic infrastructure necessary for the emergence of the national bourgeoisie. This raises extremely complex questions about the lines of domination in the relations between the state elite and the newly created economic elite.

Finally, what are the *limits* of the relative autonomy of the state? How far can a "revolution from above" by a fraction of the state apparatus (for example the military fraction in Peru) go in transforming economic and political structures?

The Organic-Statist Approach to the State⁵⁸

All too often post-World War II political science references to the theory of the organic state are restricted to Hegel or to twentieth-century fascist or totalitarian regimes that proclaimed the supremacy of the state. This association

Press, 1971), 123–35; Herbert Marcuse, "The Dialectic of the Soviet State," in his *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 85–103, and the major study by Charles Bettelheim, *Class Struggles in the USSR: First Period; 1917–1923*, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977).

57. See for example the importance Louis Althusser attaches to this point in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in his *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 128–36.

58. The term *organic statism* needs some clarification. "Organic" here refers to a normative vision of the political community in which the component parts of society harmoniously combine to enable the full development of man's potential. "Statist" is used because of the assumption in this tradition that such harmony does not occur spontaneously in the process of historical evolution but rather requires power, rational choices, and decisions, and occasional restructuring of civil society by political elites. "Organic" in this context thus is quite different from either the historical organicism of Burke or the monist organicism of Leninism. Even though the word *state* is a relatively modern term, I have used it to capture the sense that the organic unity of civil society is brought about by the architectonic action of public authorities—hence "organic-statism."

contributes to the tendency to dismiss theoretical discussions of the state as belonging to a normatively aberrant and historically brief and closed epoch of political thought. Added to this negative moral and historical perception is a methodological critique. The concept of the state was often dismissed as a reification, as a nonquantifiable, Hegelian or medieval abstraction. Or, if it was acknowledged that the concept could refer to concrete governmental and bureaucratic agencies, the reductionist school of comparative politics tended to relegate the study of the state to the “legal-institutional-descriptive” school of traditional political science. Thus history, ethics, methodology, and scholarly fashion combined virtually to eliminate the state from the central concerns of modern political science.

Fashion and misguided methodology aside, this has been unfortunate. For of course there exists an important non-German approach to the state that greatly predates Hegel, and that, far from being philosophically aberrant, and despite its tendency toward authoritarian political formulas, has been a dominant strand of political thought since the time of Aristotle. Far from being historically closed, moreover, this approach is very much alive as a philosophical and structural influence, especially in southern Europe and the countries of Latin America. This corpus of political thought is not as textually and historically specific as classical Marxism or liberal pluralism. Nonetheless, there is a body of ideas running through Aristotle, Roman law, medieval natural law and into contemporary Catholic social philosophy that together make up what I call the organic-statist tradition of political thought.⁵⁹ As in the liberal-pluralist approach, the organic-statist approach has many, sometimes contradictory, variants. But just as a contemporary pluralist can select from Locke, Madison, de Tocqueville, Truman, and common law a reasonably coherent body of ideas stressing individualism, checks and balances, autonomous interest groups, and the central role of social forces, so a twentieth-century political theorist in Latin America can just as easily select out of Aristotle, Roman law, natural law, and the papal encyclicals a cumulative body of ideas stressing the political community, the concession theory of association, and the central role of the state in achieving the common good.⁶⁰ Both bodies of ideas have intellectual

59. Most contemporary political theory textbooks are interested in developing the body of ideas that have contributed to what is seen as the main line of historical evolution of the Anglo-Saxon (and to a lesser extent, French) political culture. There is a tendency to neglect the organic-statist tradition or to select out of it those aspects most relevant for the development of the liberal-pluralist tradition or that of its major contemporary opponent, the Marxist tradition. In many undergraduate courses, this means an ungainly leap from Aristotle to Machiavelli, in the process virtually leaving out a major component of the European cultural heritage.

60. Two important caveats: First, just as liberal pluralism has variants that are not in the main line of development, so does organic statism. Twentieth-century fascist and totalitarian movements are extreme variations of the approach. I argue in Chapter 2 of *The State and Society*, however, that in some fundamental ways these deviated from some of the basic ideas of organic statism and should not be considered essential to the model. Second, liberal pluralism and organic statism at times draw upon the same corpus of writing, such as Aristotle, but they select out of the corpus different elements. In the case

coherence and, as Charles W. Anderson has argued, a distinct “basic logic” as “paradigms of social choice.”⁶¹

For liberal pluralism, the starting point is descriptive—the rational self-interest of the individual. For classic Marxism, the starting point is also descriptive—the dominant mode of production and its characteristic form of class struggle. For organic statism, the starting point is normative—the preferred form of political life of man as a member of a community.

From Aristotle to St. Thomas Aquinas to modern papal encyclicals, a central normative theme is that man’s nature can only be fulfilled within a community. Thus Aristotle says: “The man who is isolated—who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or has no need to share because he is already self-sufficient—is no part of the polis, and must therefore be either a beast or a god. . . . There is therefore an imminent impulse in all men towards an association of this order.”⁶² For Aristotle a corollary of man’s political nature is the naturalness of political institutions. “It is evident that the polis belongs to the class of things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature an animal intended to live in a polis.”⁶³

A further corollary is that political institutions require order and power. Political authority as a concept is thus perceived as necessary and legitimate in the organic-statist tradition. Aquinas, for example, states that “law must needs concern itself properly with the order directed to universal happiness,”⁶⁴ and, “order principally denotes power.”⁶⁵

It is from this perspective of man’s nature, as requiring for its happiness and fulfillment participation in a well-ordered political community, that Aristotle argued: “The polis is prior in the order of nature to the family and the individual. The reason for this is that the whole is necessarily prior [in

of Roman law, to take an example, liberal pluralism has drawn upon the rational individualistic aspects of the doctrine of contract, while the organic-statist tradition has drawn upon the concession theory and sovereignty doctrines that grant the state authority to define and promote the common good and charter associational groups. In the economic sphere, the liberal-pluralist selection of ideas is supportive of a market based economy, while the organic-statist selection of ideas is supportive of mercantilist economies.

61. He argues that: “A paradigm of public choice specifies the grounds that are appropriate for making claims within a given political order. It tells us about the kinds of arguments that are most likely to appear acceptable to political actors in arriving at policy conclusions. In this sense, it defines . . . the range of reasons that will be accepted as legitimate in political argument and debate.” See his “Public Policy, Pluralism and the Future Evolution of Advanced Industrial Society,” paper prepared for the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Sept. 4–8.

62. Aristotle, *Politics*, book I, ch. II, sect. 14, 15, pp. 6–7 (all references to Aristotle’s *Politics* refer to the Barker translation). One of the key Vatican II documents, *Gaudium et Spes*, reiterated this theme: “by his innermost nature man is a social being, and unless he relates himself to others he can neither live nor develop his potential” (Article 12). Note however the stress is on man as a social being, not a political being.

63. Aristotle, *Politics*, book I, ch. II, sect. 9, p. 5.

64. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I–II, Question 90, Article 2, p. 612 (Pegis translation).

65. *Summa Theologiae*, III (Suppl.), Question 34, Article I.

nature] to the part. If the whole body be destroyed, there will not be a foot or a hand. . . ."⁶⁶

Taken together, these arguments about the political nature of man, the necessity and legitimacy of power, and the ontological status of the political community, make the role of the state much more functionally central and normatively legitimate in the organic-statist tradition than in either liberal pluralism or the Marxist tradition. However, the differences go even deeper. The Aristotelian, Thomistic, and natural law concept that is central to the organic-statist tradition is that the state has a moral end, it has a moral *telos*. This is a significant difference between organic statism and liberal pluralism. Liberal-pluralist writings stress the neutral procedures of government within which social groups compete to define goals and policies. Organic-statist writings emphasize the ends of government and are less concerned with procedural guarantees. While Aristotle does not deny the utilitarian or instrumental advantages of political life, he always emphasizes that the higher goal is moral. Thus the polis is not merely

an association for residence on a common site, or for the sake of preventing mutual injustices and easing exchange. . . . But it is the cardinal issue of goodness or badness in the life of the polis which always engages the attention of any state that concerns itself to secure a system of good law well obeyed. . . . Otherwise, a political association sinks into mere alliance . . . law becomes a mere covenant . . . "a guarantor of men's rights against one another"—instead of being, as it should be, a rule of life such as will make the members of a polis good and just.⁶⁷

The moral center of the organic-statist vision is thus not the individual taken by himself but rather the political community whose perfection allows the individual members to fulfill themselves: "The end of the individual is the same as that of the political community. . . but, even so, the end of the political community is a greater thing to attain and maintain, and a thing more ultimate, than the end of the individual."⁶⁸

The concern for the pursuit of the common good leads to a de-emphasis or rejection of procedural forms and to a rejection of the legitimacy of "private interests" even if these private interests represent the majority: "The true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of the few, or of the many, are perversions."⁶⁹

A standard contemporary treatise of Catholic social philosophy characteristically assigns a central role to the common good: "The common good is the prevailing principle that controls any other interest in its order. It is the creative principle, the conserving power of the body politic; it is the final cause of the

66. *Politics*, book I, ch. II, sects. 12 and 13, p. 6.

67. *Politics*, book III, ch. IX, sects. 12 and 8, pp. 118–19.

68. *Ethics*, book I, ch. II, sect. 8 (Barker translation), p. 355.

69. *Politics*, book III, ch. VII, p. 139 (Jowett translation).

state, its intimate end, it and nothing else gives the political, sovereign power its moral authority and legitimacy."⁷⁰ It should be noted that this "common good," while by no means intrinsically antidemocratic, lends itself to nonliberal legitimacy formulas in organic statism for two basic reasons. First, it opens the possibility that, since the common good can be known by "right reason," there is no need for a process whereby interest groups express their opinions and preferences in order for the leaders of the state to "know" what the common good is. Second, as the quotation above indicates, the pursuit of the common good (rather than elections or representation by group interests) is the measure by which the legitimacy of the state is evaluated.

This vision of the common good and the organic political community has led in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to a moral rejection by all variants of organic statism of both liberalism and Marxism. Marxism is rejected in part because its view of class conflict violates the organic-statist ideal of the harmonious community, which is to be constructed by political action. For example, Leo XIII, in *Rerum Novarum*, presents the following argument:

The great mistake made in regard to the matter now under consideration is to take up with the notion that class is naturally hostile to class, and that the wealthy and the workingmen are intended by nature to live in mutual conflict. So irrational and so false is this view, that the direct contrary is the truth. Just as the symmetry of the human frame is the resultant of the disposition of the bodily members, so in a State is it ordained by nature that these two classes should dwell in harmony and agreement, and should, as it were, groove into one another, so as to maintain the balance of the body politic.⁷¹

The liberal state and classical capitalism are likewise rejected because they lead to abuses and antagonism between classes, and because the state does not

70. Heinrich A. Rommen, *The State in Catholic Social Thought: A Treatise in Political Philosophy* (St Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1945), 310. For a more extensive discussion, see the chapters "Organic View of the State," and "The State as a Moral Organism." Aquinas, in *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, Question 94, discusses the content of the common good when he analyzes the three ends of Natural Law, which right reason dictates governments should follow. Like Aristotle—but less strongly—he emphasizes that man's nature requires some political participation for fulfillment. However, of course, neither is democratic in a "one-man one-vote" sense, because there is a tension between the claims of political participation and the claims of the more basic principle of the common good.

71. Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum* (1881), in Anne Freemantle (ed.), *The Papal Encyclicals in their Historical Context* (New York: New American Library, 1963), 174. After Vatican II, the Catholic Church softened substantially its doctrinal criticism of Marxism. Nonetheless, a close reading of recent church documents shows that the preferred social solution still is normally one that eschews both Marxist ideas of class conflict and liberal ideas of unchecked competition in favor of more "communitarian" formulas. Thus in Peru, for example, the current military regime's initial program of imposed structural change in order to bring about a solidarist society with full communal participation was explicitly endorsed by leading church figures as being consistent with "the major new social teaching of the church" (Interview with Bishop Bambarén in Lima, Nov. 12, 1972). The complex relationship of the post-Vatican II church to the organic-statist tradition will be developed further in later chapters. Also see Luigi Einaudi and Alfred Stepan, *Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1971).

play its morally proper role of actively furthering the balance in the body politic by pursuing the common good. Thus, in the same encyclical, Leo XIII writes: "Some remedy must be found, and found quickly, for the misery and wretchedness pressing so heavily and unjustly at this moment on the vast majority of the working classes. . . . Workingmen have been surrendered, all isolated and helpless, to the hardheartedness of employers and the greed of unchecked competition."⁷²

Forty years later, Pius XI, in his *Quadragesimo Anno* (*On Reconstructing the Social Order*), commented that Leo XIII, faced with what he perceived as growing class conflict and disintegration of the social order, had

sought no help from either Liberalism or Socialism, for the one had proved that it was utterly unable to solve the social problem aright, and the other, proposing a remedy far worse than the evil itself, would have plunged human society into greater dangers. . . . With regard to civil authority, Leo XIII, boldly breaking through the confines imposed by Liberalism, fearlessly taught that government must not be thought a mere guardian of law and of good order, but rather must put forth every effort so that through the entire scheme of laws and institutions . . . both public and individual well-being may develop spontaneously out of the very structure and administration of the State.⁷³

The state in the organic-statist tradition is thus clearly interventionist and strong. However, it is important to understand that a just and stable organic order is not necessarily to be equated with the established order. The concept of the common good, with the moral obligation it imposes on the state to achieve the general welfare, leaves open the possibility that the state can formulate and impose on its own initiative major changes in the established order so as to create a more just society. From Aristotle to Aquinas to modern popes, there is therefore a strong normative tradition in organic-statist political thought in which the state is conceived of as playing a relatively autonomous, architectural role in the polity. A standard contemporary text of Catholic social theory, bearing the papal imprimatur, illustrates how the idea of imposed change and the need to create an organic order are closely interrelated:

A distortion in the social organism may disturb the balanced functioning and welfare of the whole. If this should occur, the supreme protector of the order, whatever its form, the state in that significant sense, has the right and duty to intervene. . . . Catholic political philosophy is aware . . . that the actual *ordo*, through the shielding of vested interests, can become unjust, that the changing circumstances in social and economic life demand the abolition of unintended privileges

72. *Ibid.* 167.

73. Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno*, in Freemantle (ed.), *The Papal Encyclicals in their Historical Context*, 229–30. Further evidence of the strong directing role the state should exercise in order to contribute to the organic, harmonious society is found in Pius XII, *Summi Pontificatus* (*On the Function of the State in the Modern World*, 1939), where he argues "it is the noble prerogative and function of the State to control, aid, and direct the private and individual activities of national life that they converge harmoniously towards the common good." See Freemantle (ed.), *The Papal Encyclicals*, 266.

protected by the existing order; it knows, in other words, that the positive order may contradict the ideal order of peace and justice.

The order of laissez-faire capitalism thus has become unjust, creating unwarranted privileges of vested property rights against unjustly suppressed personal rights of the working classes. Formal right can, under our mode of existence, become material wrong. In these conditions the state needs power and must apply force for the sake of its own end. . . . *It must forcefully change parts of the actual order which have grown unjust . . . it must use force against the selfish resistance of the privileged interests that range themselves above the new and juster order.*⁷⁴

Some of the paradoxes of contemporary Latin American politics become understandable if one keeps in mind this organic-statist principle, namely that the goal of a stable, organically integrated society might entail radical change in basic structures. The Peruvian military's "radical" land reform was organic-statist in this sense. The military perceived one class, the oligarchical land owners, as contributing to a revolutionary disintegration of society. In an action consistent with the implications of the organic-statist model, the military attempted to use their power to create a new organic relationship among Peruvians. The apparent radicalism of parts of the Catholic Church in Latin America also has strong organic-statist overtones. In 1968, the Latin American Bishops Conference endorsed the view that Latin America found itself in "a situation of injustice which could be termed one of institutionalized violence, because current structures violate fundamental rights creating a situation which demands global, bold, urgent, and profoundly renovating transformation."⁷⁵

Thus in the organic-statist tradition of political thought, despite the concern for stability, there is a justification for rapid structural change and for a strong state that can impose this change. It is necessary, however, to note that two normative principles, in theory at least, are meant to restrict legitimate state action within the limits imposed by the concept of organic unity. The first principle is that, whatever its form, the state must pursue as its end the common good. For Aristotle, a government that did not rule with a view to the common interest was a "perversion." For Aquinas, an unjust law "seems to be no law at all." Consistent with this interpretation is the fact that the most extensive arguments for "tyrannicide" are found in the works of natural law theorists who stress that the ruler must always rule within the limits imposed by natural law.⁷⁶

The second, and historically more important, principle is that, although the state is the most perfect political community, all the component parts

74. Rommen, *The State in Catholic Thought*, 203, 292 (emphasis added).

75. CELAM (Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano), *Documento Final de la Comisión No. 1*, Subcommittee II, sect. III (Bogota, Sept. 1968).

76. The most coherent and explicit development of this theme is found in the work of the 16th-century political theorist Francisco Suárez; see Bernice Hamilton, *Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain: A Study of the Political Ideas of Vitoria, De Soto, Suárez, and Molina* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), esp. 61–6.

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(individual, family, private association) have a proper function of their own within the organic whole. Thus each part has a sphere of natural action that the state should not eliminate. Since the 1930s this concept has been explicitly referred to as "the principle of subsidiarity." A recent restatement by John XXIII shows that it is still meant to be a limiting parameter to what he saw as the necessarily increasing role of the state in the furtherance of the common good:

This intervention of public authorities that encourages, stimulates, regulates, supplements, and complements, is based on the *principle of subsidiarity* as set forth by Pius XI in his Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*: "It is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry. So, too, it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order, to transfer to the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies. Inasmuch as every social activity should, by its very nature, prove a help to members of the body social, it should never destroy or absorb them."⁷⁷

The subsidiarity principle is the central feature that distinguishes the concept of "organic" in the organic-statist model from the concept of "organic" in the Leninist model of "command socialism." In contrast to liberal pluralism, both the organic-statist and Leninist models give an important place to the concept of organic political unity and give the state a major role to perform in achieving such unity. In Lenin's command-socialist model, however, the organic unity can emerge only after the dictatorship of the proletariat has abolished all elements of subsidiarity. For Lenin, "harmonious organization" is the end result of the total penetration and transformation of all units of society.

The resolution adopted by the recent Moscow Congress of the Soviets advanced as the primary task of the moment the establishment of a "harmonious organization," and the tightening of discipline. Everyone now readily "votes for" and "subscribes to" resolutions of this kind; but usually people do not think over the fact that the application of such resolutions calls for coercion—coercion precisely in the form of dictatorship. And yet it would be extremely stupid and absurdly utopian to assume that the transition from capitalism to socialism is possible without coercion and without dictatorship. . . .

The foundation of socialism—calls for absolute and strict *unity of will*, which directs the joint labour of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of people. . . . Revolution demands—precisely in the interests of its development and consolidation, precisely in the interests of socialism—that the people *unquestioningly obey the single will of the leaders of labour*.⁷⁸

77. John XXIII, *Mater et Magistra (Christianity and Social Progress, 1961)*, in Anne Freeman, (ed.), *The Social Teachings of the Church* (New York: New American Library, 1963), 228–9. In Aristotle and Aquinas there is less emphasis on the rights of the parts against the whole. This emphasis in the modern church is a response to the secular claims of the liberal state and the total penetration claims of Marxism–Leninism.

78. V. I. Lenin, "The Immediate Tasks of Government," in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 420, 424–5 (emphasis in original).

Such a model of the unified political community is built upon a monist relationship between the party-state and the citizens in which intermediate groups are perceived as serving neither a necessary nor a legitimate function. Thus, in *The State and Revolution*, Lenin argues: “accounting and control—that is the *main* thing required for ‘arranging’ the smooth working, the correct functioning of the *first phase* of communist society. *All* citizens are transformed here into hired employees of the state, which consists of the armed workers. *All* citizens become employees and workers of a *single* nation-wide state ‘syndicate’ The whole of society will have become a single office and a single factory, with equality of labor and equality of pay.”⁷⁹

This distinction between the view of the organic community in command socialism and organic statism is so fundamental that it is one of the distinguishing characteristics of each as an analytic model, as I show in the concluding section of this chapter.

In terms of organic-statist normative theory, we have stated the main concepts: the political nature of man, the goal of the organically related community in which the subsidiary parts play a legitimate and vital role, the state’s proper role in interpreting and promoting the common good, and the radical changes the state may legitimately impose to create an organic society. Any political tendency, if it is more than just a body of ideas, is however an amalgam of articulated norms and empirically identifiable sets of structures and practices.

A particularly influential set of structures and practices that are normatively congruent—and, in the Iberic and Latin American countries, historically associated—with the organic-statist tendency is Roman law. For our purposes, the impact of Roman law on interest association is especially salient. The Greek idea that the public common interest should prevail, and that organized private interests should be allowed only the freedom consistent with the organic functioning of society, took on new significance when transferred from the city-state to the context of the bureaucratic-state of the Roman Empire. Here, in the name of organic relationships, the statist element became extremely strong. The core assumption of group pluralists such as Bentley that the polity is composed of groups that are “freely combining, dissolving and recombining in accordance with their interest lines,” is normatively and empirically alien to the Roman law “concession theory” of association. In contrast to group-pluralist ideas that interest groups are unchartered, Roman law posited that groups had to be “chartered” by the state. As the German legal historian Rudolph Sohm observed. “With but few exceptions all societies were, on

79. (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, n.d.), 161–2 (emphasis in original). He immediately adds that “this ‘factory’ discipline . . . is by no means our ideal, or our ultimate goal. It is but a necessary step for the purpose of thoroughly purging society of all infamies and abominations of capitalist exploitation, and for further progress.” After the dictatorship of the proletariat has completed its tasks “then the door will be open for the transition from the first phase of the communist society to its higher phase, and with it to the complete withering away of the state.”

principle, prohibited. The law recognized no freedom of association. Only those societies were lawful which owed their existence to *lex specialis*, or 'privilege.' A lawful society—such was the view taken—cannot be the creation of a private individual; it can only be the creation of the State operating through the medium of a statute."⁸⁰

In exchange for the privilege of official recognition, the association accepted obligations that in essence made it "part of the organization of the State."⁸¹ Emile Durkheim, often mistakenly seen as an advocate of authoritarian corporatism, decried the impact of such controls on the workers' groups in Roman society because, he argued, "they ended by becoming part of the administrative machine. They fulfilled official functions; each occupation was looked upon as a public service whose corresponding corporation had obligations and responsibilities towards the State."⁸²

In the late Roman Empire, and later in the Iberian and Latin American countries, this concession theory of interest groups, utilized in the name of organic unity, has given the state an important lever by which to shape the scope and content of demands articulated by interest groups.⁸³ Indeed, the concession theory also has provided the normative rationale for the complex mechanisms by which the state itself creates and charters interest groups from above, often leaving a structural legacy of high responsiveness on the part of interest groups to demands originating from the state.⁸⁴

One last historical-empirical note concerning the organic-statist tradition must be added. In the liberal-pluralist tradition, the absolutist period is seen as

80. Rudolph Sohm, *The Institutes: A Textbook of the History and System of Roman Private Law*, trans. J. C. Ledlie, 2nd edn., rev. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), 198–9.

81. *Ibid.* 199.

82. Preface to the Second Edition, "Some Notes on Occupational Groups," in Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. G. Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1964), 8.

83. This will be a major theme that is developed later in the book. For the argument that the establishment of state control of associations in the Roman Empire was motivated by "fears for public order" see W. W. Buckland, *Roman Law and Common Law: A Comparison in Outline* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936), 53. For a discussion and documentation of the influence of Roman Law concession theory in Spanish America, see Ronald C. Newton, "On 'Functional Groups,' 'Fragmentation,' and 'Pluralism' in Spanish American Political Society," *Hispanic American Historical Review* (Feb. 1970), esp. 16–17.

84. Note that it is the restrictive chartering by the state rather than its role in association creation that is most analytically relevant for the question of the degree of subsequent autonomy. For example, the state may play a crucial role in the growth of associations, as in the case of the U.S. government's support for union organization given by the Wagner act. But, because the state did not at the same time build in extensive control mechanisms the unions subsequently became relatively autonomous sources of countervailing power. See, for example, J. K. Galbraith, *American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power*, rev. edn. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957), 128, 135–53. Contrast Galbraith's account with that by Kenneth Paul Erickson, "Corporative Controls of Labor in Brazil," paper delivered at 1971 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago. The construction of control mechanisms—and the subsequent system-level consequences of these mechanisms—is discussed later in this book in relation to the Vargas and Cárdenas governments.

one of attack on the medieval church and feudal structures, laying the groundwork for the modern liberal constitutional state, which in turn put checks on absolutist power. In Iberian countries and their ex-colonies, however, absolutism, though it existed, was different in two key respects. First, because the Iberian peninsula did not experience the Reformation in full force, in the period of centralizing monarchy an effort was made to reconcile the principles of absolutist statecraft with natural law traditions. Second, because these countries did not fully experience the socioeconomic processes that accompanied the inauguration of the liberal constitutional state, the absolutist legacy in government and bureaucracy further strengthened the statist components of the organic-statist tradition.⁸⁵

Intellectual awareness of organic statism furthers several analytical causes. Roman law and natural law were the predominant ingredients of the intellectual and political heritage of European philosophy since shortly after Christ until at least the sixteenth century. Many of the basic institutions of Western society—legal systems, bureaucracies, interest groups—were for much of modern history decisively shaped by organic statism and to this day, even in the non-Catholic countries of Western Europe, there are still understudied structural legacies. In addition, as one of the classic Western formulations of the relationship between the state and society, this body of ideas remains “available” for use and adaptation everywhere in the western European cultural area. It provides an intellectual framework for understanding movements, legitimacy formulas, administrative devices, and regimes that have been influenced by this tradition of political thought.

The organic-statist model seems to me to be particularly suitable for partial incorporation into analyses of political development when studying the Latin American pattern of development, where, as I have indicated, the strong normative and empirical tradition of government-chartered interest groups contrasts with some of the basic assumptions of pluralist associational patterns, and where the pattern of delayed dependent development has, from a Marxist perspective, contributed to nonhegemonic class relations that often give the state apparatus some autonomy.

My working hypothesis is that many of the political elites in Latin America have in fact responded to their perceptions of impending crises of modernization and control by invoking, in a variety of modern forms, many of the central ideas of the organic-statist, non-liberal, non-Marxist model of state-society relations described here, and have attempted to use the power of the state to forge regimes with marked corporatist characteristics.

85. Sohm comments on the absolutist attitude toward association: “from the sixteenth century onwards the system of absolutist government, with its rigorous control of private life, struck root in Germany as elsewhere. Such a system was obviously quite as hostile to private societies as the Roman monarchy. It refused altogether to recognize the principle of free association, and required the sanction of the State for the formation of any society whatsoever.” Sohm, *The Institutes*, 200.

Organic Statism as a Model of Governance

Organic statism as presented thus far in this chapter has coherence as a normative and historical tendency in political theory, as an ideology, and as a description of one possible mode of articulation between society and the state. In this concluding section, I wish to shift from normative, historical and concrete questions of organic statism to consider organic statism more abstractly as a model of governance. We will be particularly interested in two questions: first, how does it compare with other models, such as classic liberalism or “command socialism”?⁸⁶ Second, what predicaments, tensions, or inherent contradictions exist within organic statism as a model?

As models of governance, command socialism and classic liberalism seem to arrive at “optimal” solutions by maximizing different principles of coordination. Classic liberalism, in theory, maximizes information, self interest, freedom, and competition to arrive at maximum economic efficiency and political equilibrium. Command socialism, in theory, maximizes control of the economy by state planning and achieves a perfectly integrated, monist political community by eliminating the autonomy of all groups and by building new collectivist values and structures. Organic statism in contrast, as a model of governance, does not maximize any of the polar principles of coordination of the two other modes of articulation between state and society. Such crucial features of organic-statism as the “concession theory” of private associations involve a far more interventionist role for the state in politics than posited in classical liberalism. However the “principle of subsidiarity” posits less penetration of society by the state in organic statism than that posited by command socialism. Organic statism, in theory, accords an important role for the decentralized political participation of semi-autonomous functional groups. This role is absent in the Leninist version of the harmonious organization of the political community in command socialism. The model of organic statism implies “limited pluralism” in the community, while the model of command socialism implies a “monist” community.

In classic liberalism the economic principle of coordination that is maximized is individual competition in the market; in command socialism it is centralized state planning. Organic-statist concepts of the priority of the political community and of the state’s responsibility for the common good imply strong constraints on laissez-faire market individualism. However, the principle of subsidiarity implies equally strong limitations on the legitimacy of the state to act as the chief power of the means of production and chief planner of the economy.

86. I originally considered classic Marxism as an analytic approach to the state in capitalist societies. However, here I am concerned with the Leninist model of the state as an instrument to forge socialism. To use a more generic term than Leninism, I call such a model “command socialism.” I have already considered some of the features of such a model in the extensive quotations from Lenin.

An economic formula congruent with organic statism is thus one in which the state plays a decisive role in constructing the parameters, rules, and infrastructure of a market economy. In addition, the limits to "egoistic individualism" and "state centralism" posited in the model leads to a key role for intermediate self-managing "labor-capital" functional groups that are assumed to be a modern organic-statist industrial formula for arriving at the harmonious integration of the component parts of the economy.

To present graphically the differences between organic statism, command socialism, and classical liberalism as models of governance, we can place each model on a grid, illustrating the means through which political and economic goals are determined. (See Figure 2.1.)

Although no concrete regimes fit these abstract models completely, Apter has shown that, on analytic grounds alone, each of his somewhat similar polar models predictably faces characteristic tensions and predicaments. The predicament of classic liberalism is that some groups in society (including the government "group") may obtain greater political and economic power than others, upsetting the "perfect competition" assumed by the model. The predicament of command socialism is that coercion may become so high, and the flow of information so low, that distortions and irrationality affect both the economic and political system.⁸⁷

Although in theory organic statism may represent a desirable balance between the two poles of classic liberalism and command socialism, in actuality it too contains inherent predicaments as a model. On the one hand, the statist component of the model implies a strong role for the state in structuring




FIG. 2.1. Location of three models in terms of means through which political and economic goals are determined

87. Apter calls his polar models "the secular-liberatarian model" and the "sacred-collectivity model." For his presentation of these models with their characteristic predicaments, see *The Politics of Modernization*, esp. 28-36.

society so that it conforms with the model's assumption of functional parts that are perfectly integrated into a solidaristic whole. The role of the state is to ensure this integration between the parts and the whole. On the other hand, each of the parts is theoretically self-managing, so that there is a high degree of participation within state-chartered, organic structures. The predictable distorting tension in the model is that in the initial construction of the system from above, the state, in order to ensure integration and control, builds such strong control mechanisms into the new state-chartered functional groups that the meaningful participation posited by the model never becomes a reality. In later chapters I discuss numerous examples of concrete corporatist structures imposed from above by the state in which actual autonomy and participation is severely restricted. This, then, is the almost inherent distorting tension in organic statism stemming from the statist component of the model.

The other tension stems from the organic-participatory component of the model. If self-managing groups are in fact allowed to exercise a degree of decentralized autonomy, some groups may acquire political or economic control over others, and this violates the model's presupposition of organic harmony between the different functional groups within society. Thus either self-management and autonomy is allowed and the goal of intergroup balance and harmony is violated, or the state imposes restrictions on self-management and violates the supposition of decentralized group autonomy.⁸⁸

Political elites who attempt to create systems that approximate the organic-statist model commonly come to power, as we shall see, in the context of elite perceptions of crises in pluralist systems and the failure of self-regulating mechanisms. In response to this perceived crisis, the role of the state is broadened and the perceived "responsibility" for the direction of the national economy is shifted from pluralist mechanisms of self-regulation to statist mechanisms. Yet, while the state comes to be considered responsible for the success or failure of the new order, the inherent limitations to state power that are implied in the organic statist model may seriously impede its ability to

88. The organic-statist model, purely as a model, faces other logical and empirical problems. First, there are no obvious criteria for assigning exact representational weight to functional groups. Whatever criteria are selected there is the danger of over-enfranchising some functional groups while disenfranchising important nonfunctional groups based on ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional identities. Second, the model assumes that vertical functional groups are the "natural" organic representational vehicles of modern society. However, in a complex modern society this is probably a more "artificial" representational vehicle than are broader, horizontal parties and movements. Third, multinational corporations challenge the very idea of an organic-statist society, but some of their major structures lie beyond the organizational formulas of organic statism. For a discussion of the first two problems along these lines, see Max Weber's section on "Representation by the Agents of Interest Groups," in Talcott Parsons (ed.), *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 421-3, and Juan Linz's "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science*, 9 vols. (Reading, Mass.: Addison Publishing, 1975), iii. 175-441. I discuss the problems presented for the model by multinational corporations in Ch. 7, of *The State and Society*.

achieve success. The new, controlled, functional group process posited by the model may never be brought into being because of the power and autonomy of major groups in society that emerged during the phase of pluralist politics. Short of totalitarian or revolutionary mobilization and penetration, it may be impossible for a state elite to restructure such existing interest groups. But such mobilization and penetration would not only be a violation of the model on theoretical grounds but would also risk alienating the original coalition that supported the state elite on the supposition that limited pluralism would be respected and mass mobilization avoided. The new organic-statist regime may thus be caught in the contradictions that flow from its intermediate position within the full range of alternative models of articulation between state and society.

Apart from this contradiction in the political sphere, organic-statist regimes face a parallel contradiction in the economic sphere. They commonly commit themselves to an intermediate statist model that is "neither capitalist nor communist," by replacing private initiative with overall public regulation in economic life, at the same time retaining the marketplace as the basic mechanism for distributing goods and services. They retain a system that is heavily dependent on entrepreneurial initiative and market flows, while to some extent undermining both. In the economic sphere, as in the political sphere, they may thus face the problems of both of the principal alternative models, while benefiting from the advantages of neither.

Partly because of these inherent tensions in the abstract model of organic statism, in most concrete cases of regimes that initially announce organic-statist principles, there is a political tendency to move toward greater control over groups via manipulative corporatist politics (especially with regard to working class groups) than is theoretically posited in the model, and there is a tendency in economic policy to allow greater entrepreneurial freedom for capitalism than is posited in the model. Such regimes thus become authoritarian-corporatist capitalist regimes.⁸⁹

Yugoslavia acquired added theoretical and political importance because it was an attempt to introduce greater degrees of self-management into the command socialist model. Tanzania became particularly important because of its endeavor to find a formula to reconcile revolutionary power in a one-party state with a significant degree of binding accountability of the rulers to the ruled.⁹⁰ Similarly, the Peruvian experiment gained special significance

89. Such concrete regimes are a subtype of Linz's general category of 'authoritarian' as opposed to "democratic" or "totalitarian" regimes, in that they possess *limited*, but not *responsible*, pluralism. For his typological contrast between "democratic," "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" regimes see his initial statement "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology* (New York: Free Press, 1970), 251-83, 374-81.

90. For a perceptive analysis of the achievements and limits of Tanzania's 1965 election campaign for posts within the one-party system in which 22 out of 31 party officeholders were unsuccessful and 16 out of 31 MPs lost, see Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party*

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because it represented an attempt to develop new possibilities, and to resolve some of the central predicaments within a major model of governance—organic statism.

Transformation and Economic Development, expanded ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 382–405. I discuss self-management in Yugoslavia in ch. 6 of *The State and Society*.